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Demographic trends in most developed economies are characterized by rising longevity and 
decreasing birthrates. These trends endanger the sustainability of the current public pension 
systems. Therefore social security reform proposals are on the agenda in many countries. This 
paper demonstrates that the analysis of fiscal sustainability of social security must include an 
additional dimension of public policy, namely education funding. Indeed, the productivity 
growth of future workers, which depends on human capital accumulation, may outweigh the 
impact of the demographic problem. This fact is true under both pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and 
fully funded (FF) social security system. We consider an OLG economy where government, 
in addition to running social security, also funds education of future workers by means of 
taxes collected from the current ones. The education tax rates are chosen, in each period, by a 
majoritarian rule among the relevant constituents. We demonstrate that while the FF system 
results in relatively higher rates of physical capital accumulation, then under some conditions, 
other things equal, the PAYG social security regime leads to the choice of relatively higher 
respective levels of education tax rates in all generations, and thereby to higher rates of 
human capital accumulation. 
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1.  Introduction 
In all developed economies longevity continues to rise while birthrates are near or below 
replacement levels. Both of these demographic trends lead to a decreasing dependency ratio in 
public pension systems, i.e., the relationship between the number of working adults and the 
number of recipients of retirement benefits.  Social security systems exist in all developed 
economies and, moreover, it represents the largest public program. The downward trend of the 
dependency ratio is therefore rightly viewed as the sign of looming crisis of public pension 
systems, raising doubts about future solvency of existing programs. Hence the social security 
reform proposals are on the immediate public policy agenda.  The public policy debate has 
stimulated and has relied on empirical and theoretical analyses that attempt to evaluate 
conditions for sustained solvency of alternative social security arrangements (Diamond (1999), 
Feldstein (2005)).  
While this literature focuses on the demographic trend of the dependency ratio for its 
predictions, a large part of it treats dynamics of future productivity (also a critical component of 
fiscal sustainability) as exogenously given. Many other papers, e.g., Diamond and Orszag 
(2005), Hines and Taylor (2005), Sinn (2000), similarly unequivocal about the insolvency, 
rightly observe that dynamics of future productivity is itself negatively affected by the growth of 
social security program’s obligations, due to the depressing effect on private saving. The effect 
of introducing social security on savings and welfare has been widely discussed in the literature 
going back to Feldstein (1974).
2  Most of this literature, however, tended to overlook the fact that 
social security system may affect future productivity also through the channel of human capital 
                                                           
2 Karni and Zilcha (1989) provided a general equilibrium analysis of this problem within an OLG 
framework.   3
accumulation.  A notable exception, in direct response to Feldstein (1974), was the paper by 
Pogue and Sgontz (1977). They pointed out that a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system 
creates incentives (both individual and collective) for investment in younger generation’s 
education. Furthermore, they argued that a portion of the consumption increase in the data, 
interpreted by Feldstein (1974) as an evidence of dissaving triggered by the expected pension 
transfers, in fact consisted of such human capital investment. Thus, they conjectured that “the 
introduction of [PAYG] social security has led to a substitution of human for physical capital” 
and pointed to the post-1938 trends consistent with this claim.   
Our intended contribution in this paper is to provide a thorough theoretical analysis of 
this conjecture in a general equilibrium framework and to demonstrate that the effect of a social 
security system on human capital accumulation is essential for evaluating its fiscal sustainability.  
Indeed, as argued above the outlook on solvency depends not only on demographic dependency 
ratio, but also on productivity of the future work force, hence on investment in human capital.  A 
robust growth of this production factor may serve as a counterweight to the decline of 
dependency ratio and even a possible reduction, due to aforementioned adverse effects of social 
security on private saving, in the relative share of physical capital. Note that the growth of future 
productivity is critical for the solvency of social security not only under PAYG system, where 
benefits are directly dependent on the stream of payroll taxes paid by future workforce, but also 
in the case of fully funded social security where investment return on social security's funds 
depends on future labor productivity. Given the role of human capital in productivity growth, we 
argue that public funding of education is an important policy dimension affecting fiscal 
dynamics of a social security system. Therefore this dimension is also essential for a comparative 
analysis of PAYG and fully funded social security systems, which is the focus of this paper.    4
The role of both public and private investment in education in the relationship between 
social security funding and economic growth was noted and analyzed for the case of PAYG 
social security by  Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), Glomm and Kaganovich (2003) and 
Köthenbürger and Poutvaara (2006).
3 A branch of recent literature which includes Kemnitz 
(2000), Boldrin and Montes (2005), Poutvaara (2006) and Soares (2006), examines the 
relationship between public provision of education and PAYG social security as an issue of 
political economy and intergenerational contract.  The present paper is the first to our knowledge 
to focus on the comparison of PAYG and fully funded social security systems in terms of the 
incentives they generate for public funding of education, which plays the dominant role in 
education systems of most developed countries. In particular, we consider the implications of the 
alternative pension regimes for political determination of public education funding levels, hence 
for growth in a general equilibrium framework. 
In most cases major social security reform proposals discussed in the US and Europe 
entail a transition from PAYG to a fully funded system. We therefore undertake a comparative 
analysis of these alternative arrangements in an economy where government, in addition to 
running social security trust fund, also finances education of future workers by means of taxes 
collected from the current workers.  We use an overlapping generations economy where 
                                                           
3 Some authors have also analyzed interactions between publicly funded social security system 
and privately funded education. Zhang and Zhang (1998) find that a PAYG social security 
program can actually speed up economic growth when there are interaction effects with fertility 
and investment in human capital. Pecchenino and Utendorf (1999) consider a similar setting but 
assume exogenous fertility; under some conditions they obtain a result opposite to that of Zhang 
and Zhang (1998): on the margin, social security crowds out education and lowers growth. 
Docquier and Paddison (2003) compare the implications of PAYG and fully funded social 
security regimes for growth via individual incentives to invest (privately) in education. Under 
some conditions they find that the effect of a fully funded system may be positive, while the 
effect of a PAYG system is negative. Lambrecht et al (2005) qualify that the above conclusion 
about the negative effect of PAYG systems may be overturned in economies where private 
bequest motives are inoperative. 
   5
individuals differ in the levels of human capital they attain and thereby in the levels of income. 
In this framework, public funding of education is provided by the government uniformly to all 
young agents, whereas inequality of attainment arises due to unequal innate abilities and parental 
inputs. Public funds are budgeted through a dedicated education tax on working adults.  
We first assume that the education tax rates across generations are exogenously given and 
compare economic growth outcomes under alternative social security regimes: PAYG and fully 
funded. We show that if defined contribution rates are the same the fully funded regime strictly 
dominates the PAYG regime in terms of human and physical capital creation and thereby in 
terms of aggregate output at all times from the inception of the pension systems. This means, that 
when population longevity in the model is high, such that demographic dependency ratio is low, 
the fully funded social security system is more likely to maintain fiscal sustainability without 
disrupting economic growth. Furthermore, comparing intragenerational income distributions 
along the equilibrium paths corresponding to the alternative social security regimes, we find that, 
under plausible assumptions, PAYG social security system results in higher income inequality 
relative to the fully funded case. 
Next, we abandon the condition of exogenous determination of education taxes and 
introduce a political mechanism. We assume that the education tax rate is chosen, in each period, 
by a majoritarian rule among the relevant constituents. We demonstrate that the comparative 
growth relationship between the alternative social security regimes depends on the initial human 
capital distribution and the political process. In particular, we show that that under some 
plausible conditions, the PAYG social security regime can lead to the choice of relatively higher 
respective levels of education tax rates and thereby to higher rates of human capital accumulation 
than a fully funded system, controlling for the social security tax rates. Thus, when the political   6
dimension of public education funding is taken into account, PAYG social security regime may 
under some conditions dominate in terms of long-term sustainability prospects given the critical 
role of human capital as a factor of economic growth. While fully funded social security regime 
is known to be more favorable (other things equal) than PAYG to private saving and thus to 
physical capital creation, a notable feature of PAYG system is that it makes pension benefits of 
future retirees more directly dependent on productivity of future workers.   
 
2.   The Model  
We study an overlapping generations economy populated by heterogeneous family dynasties, 
indexed by the family name ω∈Ω. The only sources of heterogeneity are the differences of 
human capital levels of the members of the initial generation in period t=0 and the (random) 
innate ability. Each generation consists of agents whose adult life has two periods of equal 
lengths: the young adult age during which each agent inelastically supplies one unit of labor time 
to work and raises one offspring, and, subject to survival, the old age spent in retirement. Since 
each young adult produces one offspring, the population remains constant in every generation.  
Let  μ be the Lebesgue measure on Ω.  Without loss of generality we set the measure of 
individuals born in each generation  μ(Ω) = 1. Thus in each time period there is measure 1 of 
workers and measure 1 of children.  At the end of the working period, everyone faces a lottery: 
dying immediately, or living throughout the entire retirement period. Implicitly, we assume a 
'childhood period' in which education is attained and no economic decisions are made. The 
probability of survival  p  is identical for all individuals. Since the measure of working 
population is always 1, this means that the measure of retired population is always equal to  p.  
We label the generation whose young adult age occurs in time period  t  as “generation t”.  An   7
individual  ω  who belongs to generation  t  is endowed when entering the adulthood period with 
the stock of human capital  ht(ω)  which also defines his effective labor capacity.   
 
Education Sector  
Human capital  ht+1(ω)  of a young individual in generation t+1 is produced by using a uniform 
public education input, but the individual’s attainment depends on his parent’s level of human 
capital  ht(ω), which reflects a well established factual such relationship.  The public input at date 
t is given by uniform and universal public expenditure Xt on educating each student of 
generation t+1. We assume the following form of the human capital production function: 
(1)      
1
11 () () (() ) tt t t hb h X
σ σ ωω ω
−
++ =   
where 0 < σ < 1  while  1() t b ω +  is a random ability parameter which is distributed on  Ω, 
identically at all times with probability measure P(.) independently of  ( ) t h ω . Furthermore, 
realizations of   1() t b ω +  are uniformly bounded above and below by positive numbers.  
According to the expression (1) human capital formation is affected by a public 
component represented by the public spending on education Xt  (in both per student and 
aggregate terms due to our convention that population measure is 1 at all times) as well as a 
private “home” education component which we assume to be proportionate to human capital 
level of a student’s parent. Thus we can interpret the coefficient σ   as a measure of efficiency of 
parental factor in education while 1 σ −  characterizes the role of the public component. These 
parameters may vary across countries reflecting cultural differences in the relative roles of home 
and public schooling in educating a child.   
 
   8
Decisions of Individual Agents 
Working adults of generation  t  allocate their after-tax wage income  (1-τt-θt)wtht(ω)  between 
current consumption  ct,t  and saving  st , thus they face individual budget constraints 
(2)      ct,t(ω) + st(ω) = (1-τt-θt)wtht(ω) 
where  wt  is the current competitive wage rate per unit of the effective labor while  τt  and  θt  
stand for current (uniform and flat) tax rates earmarked for social security and public education 
expenditures, respectively, which will be discussed in more detail later.   
We assume that public pension benefits  Tt  are uniform across (living) retirees in a given 
period  t.  In view of the agents’ uncertain survival to retirement, and the lack of bequest motive 
we assume that they make their private savings in the form of actuarially fair annuities. 
Individuals are also allowed to borrow against their future assets, in which case the variable  
st(ω)  has a negative value. The same type of actuarial notes (see Yaari (1965)) can be used to 
borrow from future (random) income (i.e., buying life insurance). Thus, negative savings are 
allowed at higher interest rates that reflects the possibility that payback may not occur (in case of 
death). This corresponds to negative savings which is equivalent to buying life insurance.  Let  
Rt+1  denote the gross rate of return on private savings of generation  t. Then the retirement 
period budget constraint faced by a surviving member of generation  t  is given by:   
(3)      ct,t+1(ω) = Rt+1st(ω)/p + Tt+1 
We assume that fair actuarial notes can be traded in the market hence actuarially fair annuities 
and life insurance policies are traded via this single financial instrument (see Yaari (1965) for a 
detailed discussion).   9
Each individual in generation t determines the values of his decision variables 
) ( ), ( ), ( 1 , , ω ω ω t t t t t s c c +  so as to maximize the expected utility of his life-time consumption: 
(4)       max  EU(ct,t(ω), ct,t+1(ω)) =  lnct,t(ω) + pβlnct,t+1(ω)  
subject to the budget constrains (2)-(3), where the intertemporal discount factor  β∈ (0,1), and 
the economy’s variables  wt, Rt+1, Tt , τt , θt  are taken as given. 
 
Government Education and Social Security Budgets  
As stated earlier, public education expenditure  Xt  is funded by a dedicated uniform tax on 
current wage income, thereby the education budget, assumed balanced at all times, is given by 
the equation  
(5)          Xt  =  t t t H w θ  
where 
(6)            ) ( ) ( ω μ ω d h H t t ∫
Ω
=    
is the aggregate supply of effective labor, i.e., the human capital, so that  t tH w   is the aggregate 
(as well as per capita, since population measure is normalized to one) labor income in period  t. 
We will initially assume that the education tax rates  θt  are exogenously given, but later, in 
Section 4 of the paper, we will incorporate it in a political economy model where in each time 
period  θt  is determined by a majoritarian rule among the relevant constituents.  
  In this paper we analyze two alternative funding arrangements for a defined contribution 
public pension system, both the focal points of the public debates on social security: a fully 
funded (FF) system and a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system.   
  Under the FF social security system, the pension benefits received in period  t+1 by all 
surviving retired individuals of generation  t  are funded by the proceeds from the payroll tax   10
collected at a flat rate  τF  in period  t  from all workers of this same generation. Thereby, the 
balance of the social security fund, maintained at all times, is given by the equation   
(7)      Tt+1 = Rt+1τFwtHt /p  
Thus the social security tax revenue collected from generation  t  workers is invested in the 
economy; the gross returns on this investment are then redistributed uniformly in period t+1 to 
surviving retirees. 
  Under the PAYG system, the pension benefits received by the generation  t  retirees are 
paid for by the payroll tax on contemporary workers, i.e., the young adults of generation t+1. We 
assume that the tax is collected at a flat rate τG . Then the PAYG social security benefit received 
by each surviving member of generation  t  (retiree) is given by   
(8)      Tt+1 = γ wt+1Ht+1   where   γ  = τG/p 
Thus unlike the fully funded system where social security fund is a part of national savings, 
under the PAYG system the payroll tax collected from generation t+1 workers passes through 
directly to the pension beneficiaries, i.e. they are redistributed among the contemporary retirees 
in this same time period  t+1.  
 
Production Economy and Public Finance 
We assume the standard form of the aggregate production function:  
(9)      
δ δ − =
1
t t t H AK Y    
where parameters satisfy  A > 0, 0 < δ < 1,  Yt is total output, Kt is the aggregate stock of 
physical capital, which is financed by the savings of the previous generation. 
In the case of FF public pension system, the aggregate savings include, in addition to the 
private component, also the savings in the social security trust. Thus one can write   11
(10)       t t t t t H w d s K τ ω μ ω + =∫
Ω
+ ) ( ) ( 1  
When the social security system is PAYG, i.e., the social security payroll tax is spent in 
the period when it is collected, there are only private savings in the economy, so that the 
aggregate physical capital in period  t+1  is given by  
(11)       ∫
Ω
+ = ) ( ) ( 1 ω μ ω d s K t t  
  Based on the above descriptions we can now define the dynamic competitive equilibria in 
this overlapping generations model. 
 
Definition.  Given the initial stock of physical capital K0 , the initial distribution of human capital 
h0(ω) and the sequence of education tax rates { }
∞
=0 t t θ , a dynamic competitive equilibrium (DCE) 
is a collection of sequences of distributions of individual household decisions 
{}
∞
= + 0 1 , , ) ( ), ( ), (
t t t t t t s c c ω ω ω , sequences of distributions of individual levels of human capital 
{}
∞
= + 0 1 ) ( t t h ω , and of aggregate amounts of physical capital and effective labor {}
∞
=0 , t t t H K ,  
sequences of factor prices {}
∞
=0 , t t t R w , as well as the sequences of government expenditures 
{} 0 , tt t TX
∞
=  such that:  
(i)  For each ω∈Ω and t=0,1,…, the collection ct,t (ω), ct,t +1(ω), st(ω) solves the individual 
household’s problem (2)-(4) where factor prices wt , Rt+1,  social security transfers Tt+1 and the 
current tax rates are taken as given; 
(ii)  Labor markets clear, i.e. given the individual human capital attainments evolve according to 
(1), the aggregate amount of effective labor  t H  employed in period  t is determined by formula  
(6);   12
(iii)  Physical capital market clears, i.e., the aggregate stock of physical capital Kt+1 employed in 
period  t+1 equals to aggregate investment (saving) made in period  t.  Under the fully funded 
arrangement of the social security system this means that Kt+1 is determined by the relationship 
(10), whereas under the PAYG system the relationship (11) applies instead. 
(iv)  Factor markets are competitive, hence according to the economy’s production function (9) 
the factor prices are determined by their marginal products: 
(12)      
11
11 1 1 1 / tt t t t R YK A KH
δ δ δδ
− −
++ + + + ==  
(13)       ( ) (1 ) / 1 tt t t t wY H A K H
δ δ δδ
− =− =−  
(v)  Government expenditures on education  Xt  are determined according to formula (5), where 
the aggregate wage income as well as the education tax rate are given; 
(vi)  Social security benefits received by generation  t  retirees are always defined by the formula 
(7) or (8) – respectively under the FF or PAYG arrangement.  
 
3.    Growth and inequality under exogenous education funding  
In this section we will first solve the model and derive recursive dynamic relationships that 
define the DCE under each of the pension systems and an exogenously given sequence of 
education tax rates {}
∞
=0 t t θ . We will then compare these DCE outcomes under the fully funded 
and the PAYG systems in terms of growth and income inequality characteristics.  In some 
instances dictated by the need of reference or clarification we will mark DCE variables and value 
functions corresponding to the FF system with a superscript  
F ; likewise the superscript  
G  will 
be used in such instances in the PAYG case.  
 
Fully Funded Social Security System   13
Since pension benefit under the fully funded system is defined by the expression (7), the old-age 
budget constraint (3) has the form  
(14)       ct,t+1(ω) = Rt+1st(ω)/p + Rt+1τFwtHt /p     
Therefore the first-order necessary (as well as sufficient, due to concavity of the logarithmic 
utility function) condition of optimum in the household problem (2)-(4) is given by the equation  
    
1
(1 ) tF t t Ft t tt
p






(note that no negativity constraints were imposed on variable  st ). Solving this system we obtain 
(15)      
1
() [ ( 1 ) () ]
1
tF t t t F t t sp w h w H
p





Substitution of this in (2) yields 
(16)       ,
1
() [ ( 1 ) () ]
1
tt F t t t F t t cw h w H
p





Similarly, substituting (15) in equation (14) and then applying formula (12) we obtain 
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1
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1
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  We now integrate equation (15) to obtain 
   
1
() () [ ( 1 ) ]
1
tF t F t t sd p w H
p
ωμ ω β τ θ τ
β
=− − −
+ ∫  
Combining this with the relationship (10) yields 
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    Integrating the expression (1) and using formula (5) and the assumption that child’s 
ability  1() t b ω +  is distributed independently of his parents’ human capital  () t h ω  we get the 
following expression for the dynamics of the aggregate human capital: 
(19)      
1
1 [] [ ( ) ] ( )
FF
tt t tt HB w H h d
σσ θ ωμ ω
−
+ = ∫   
where   () () Bbd P ω ω =∫ . 
  Relationships (18) and (19) show that both  Kt+1 and  Ht+1  are uniquely determined by the 
choice of the education tax rate  θt , as long as the prior period’s economic variables are given.  
These aggregate stocks, in turn determine equilibrium wage and interest rates in period t+1, 
according to competitive relationships (12)-(13).  
  The above analysis shows that the dynamic competitive equilibrium has Markov 
property, i.e. current DCE variables can be determined recursively based on their values in the 
previous period as well as the education tax rate given for that period.  Indeed, we have shown 
that given the DCE fundamentals at time  t,  namely the stocks of physical capital  Kt  and human 
capital  H t , the distribution of individual levels of human capital {ht(ω)}, and the education tax 
rate  θt , one can uniquely determine the next period’s fundamentals Kt+1 , H t+1 , the distribution 
of individual household consumption and saving decisions characterized by (15) and (using 
formulae (1) and (5)) the distribution of human capital {ht+1(ω)}Τ0Σ . Note that DCE wage and 
interest rates are also uniquely determined by the economy’s contemporary fundamentals 
according to (12)-(13). 
  The recursive determination of DCE also implies that welfare of households in generation  
t attained in DCE, i.e. the maximum value function in (4), are uniquely determined by the 
education tax rate θt  levied from them. This justifies their notation as Vt(ω, θt) for  ω∈Ω.    15
Substituting the optimal solution given by (16) and (17) into the utility function (4) and then 
applying relationships (18) and (19) we obtain:  
    ( , ) ( 1 ) l n [ ( 1 ) ( ) ] ( 1) l n ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) l n
F
tt F t t F t t t t Vp h H p p D ωθ β τ θ ω τ β δ θ β δ σ θ =+ − − + − − − + − − +  
where  Dt  is an expression that does not depend on individual decision variables or  t θ  . We 
transform the argument of the first logarithmic function in the above expression: 
(1 ) ( ) ( )[1 (1 / ( ))] Ft t F tt tF t t hH h H h τ θω τ ωθ τ ω −− + = − − −    
and denote 
(20)       () ( 1 / () ) tF t t gH h ω τω =−  
-- a variable which corresponds to deviation of individual human capital and income from 
respective current averages.  Substituting this expression into the above welfare function we can 
rewrite as  
(21)        
1 ( , ) ( 1 ) l n [ 1 ( ) ] ( 1) l n ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) l n
F
tt t t t t t Vp g p p D ωθ β θ ω β δ θ β δ σ θ =+ −− − − − + − − +       
where 
1
t D   is again an expression that does not depend on individual decision variables or  t θ  .   
 
Pay-as-you-go Social Security System 
Derivations here are similar to those obtained for the case of fully funded system, with 
differences due to the fact that relationships (8) and (11) need to be used in place of (7) and (10), 
respectively. According to (8), the old-age budget constraint (3) under the PAYG system has the 
form  
(22)       ct,t+1(ω) = Rt+1st(ω)/p + γ wt+1Ht+1      
Therefore the first-order necessary and sufficient condition of optimum in the household problem 
(2)-(4) is given by the equation    16
    




+ + + + ) 1 (
1
/ 1 1 1 θ γ γ
β
 
Solving this system and using relationships (12) and (13) we obtain 
(23)            ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1
1 ω θ γ β δ δ γ ω β t t t t t h w p p K p s p − − = − + + +
−  
so that  




() [ ( 1 ) () ( 1 ) ]
1
tt t t t sp p w h p K
p
ωβ γ θ ω γ δ δ
β
−
+ =− − − −
+
 
Substituting this in relationship (2) we obtain 




() [ ( 1 ) () ( 1 ) ]
1
tt t t t t cp w h p K
p
ωγ θ ω γ δ δ
β
−
+ =− − + −
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Similarly, substituting (24) in (22) and then using relationships (12)-(13) results in 
(26)      






() ( 1 ) () ( 1 )
11
(1 ) ( ) (1 )
1
t tt t




R Rp w H p
cp w h p K
pp p p R
R p
pw h p K
pp
γ β
ωγ θ ω γ δ δ
ββ
β
γθ ω γ δ δ
β






=− − − − + ⎢⎥ ++ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ =− − + − ⎣⎦ +
 
  Further, according to (6) and (11) the integration of (23) yields 
     t t t t H w p p K p p ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( 1 [ 1
1 θ γ β δ δ γ β − − = − + + +
−  
which leads to 















Note also that relationship (19) applies here without change, so we rewrite for future reference: 
 (28)       
1
1 [] [ ( ) ] ( )
GG
tt t tt HB w H h d
σσ θ ωμ ω
−
+ = ∫     17
  The above analysis confirms (see a similar explanation in the case of fully funded 
system) a recursive determination of the dynamic competitive equilibrium: given the stocks Kt 
and  Ht  , the distribution ht(ω) , as well as the education tax rate  θt , the above relationships (27), 
(28) and (1) along with (5) will uniquely determine the next period’s fundamentals  Kt+1 , Ht+1 , 
distribution of human capital ht+1(ω) .  
To obtain the maximum welfare value function Vt(ω, θt) of a generation  t  agent  ω  we 
first substitute the expressions for the young- and old-age consumption given by formulae (25) 
and (26), respectively, into the utility function (4), then apply relationships (12), (13) : 
 
1
11 1 ( , ) (1 )ln (1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )[ln( ) ln( )]
G
tt t t t t t t t Vp p w h p K p H K G ωθ β γ θ ω γ δδ β δ
−
++ + ⎡⎤ =+ − − + − + − − + ⎣⎦  
where  Gt  is an expression that does not depend on decision variables or  t θ  .  Now we use 
expressions (27) and (28) to further derive: 
(29)         
1
1
( , ) (1 ) ln(1 ) (1 )(1 ) ln (1 ) ln(1 )
(1 ) ln(1 ) (1 )(1 ) ln
G
tt t t t
tt t
Vp p p pp G
pp p G
ωθ β γ θ β δ σ θ β δ γ θ
βδ γ θ β δ σ θ
=+ − − + − − − − − − +




t G   is an expression that does not depend on decision variables or  t θ  .  This is clearly a 
strictly concave function of parameter   t θ . 
 
  Based on the derived DCE relationships we shall now compare the effects of the two 
social security regimes on growth and distribution within the confines of the experiment defined 
by the following two conditions:  
 
Condition 1. A social security system (FF or PAYG) is instituted (announced) in the economy at 
t = 0  in the sense that  generation  0  is its first beneficiary under either regime, i.e. first social 
security payments are issued at  t=1.  (Note that in the case of PAYG system this means that   18
generation  0  is in the exceptional position of receiving the benefit without having to pay the 
social security tax.)  Furthermore, for the purposes of the comparative analysis we assume that 
the social security tax rates applied under the FF and PAYG systems are identical, i.e.,   
FG p τ τγ ==.   
Condition 2. The same sequence of education tax rates { }
0 t t θ
∞
=   is exogenously given for both 
social security regimes.  
 
The following Proposition, proved in the Appendix, compares the implications of the two 
social security regimes for economic growth under the provisions of Conditions 1 and 2.   
 
Proposition 1.   Assume that each of the alternative FF and PAYG social security regimes 
satisfies Conditions 1 and 2. Then, 
F
t K  > 
G
t K   and  
F
t Y  > 
G
t Y   for  t = 1,2,…, while  ()
F
t h ω  > 
()
G
t h ω  for all  ω∈Ω   and  t = 2,3,… .
4  Thus the fully funded regime strictly dominates the 
PAYG regime in terms of both human and physical capital creation and thereby in terms of 
aggregate output at all times from the inception of the systems. 
 
We shall now consider, within the provisions of the comparative experiment defined by 
the above Conditions 1 and 2, the dynamics of intragenerational income inequality resulting 
under these two regimes of social security programs. The comparison of any two income 
distributions with respect to inequality will be through the partial ordering of the second degree 
stochastic dominance (see, Atkinson (1970)):   
 
                                                           
4 Note that according to the relationships (1) and (5)   1 ()
F h ω ≡ 1 ()
G h ω  for the initial young 
generation.   19
Definition:   Income distribution  ) (ω Y  is more unequal than income distribution  ) (
















  in second-degree, i.e. the Lorenz curve of  ) (
* ω Y  
lies strictly above that of   ) (ω Y . 
 
Starting from a given initial human capital distribution   ) ( 0 ω h  and   0 0 ,H K  , let us define 
the present actuarial values of lifetime income for each generation  t =1,2,… under the 
alternative social security regimes provided that social security tax rates are the same: 
FG
tt p τ τγ =≡ for all t,  as required by Condition 1.   
For the exogenously given sequence of education tax rates { }
0 t t θ
∞
=  the present actuarial 
value of lifetime income of generation  t  under the fully funded regime is: 





Ip w h p
p
γ
ωγ θ ω =− − +  
This can be rewritten as: 


















where  t B  is positive  and independent of  ω , 
Now we derive a similar expression for the present actuarial value of lifetime income 
under PAYG social security: 




() ( 1 ) ()
1
GG G
G tt t tt
tt t t t GG
tt t t t t
pw H h w H p
Ip w h M







=− − + = + ⎨ ⎬
−− ⎩⎭
  
where  t M  is positive and independent of ω .  
According to the definition of the production function in (9) we obtain that,   20

























Using equation (27) we can write: 




(1 ) (1 ) 1
1 ( 1) ( 1 ) ( 1)
GG
tt t t t
GG
tt
Kp p w H p p
YYp p p p
βγ θ βγ θ






++ − + − +
  
Combining this with equation (32) we rewrite equation (31): 


















    








ω ω + =   for all  ω  and 
all  t , i.e. the choice of a social security system, other things being equal, while differently 
affecting income levels of individuals will have identical effects on their relative positions in the 
distribution of incomes.  This follows directly from the human capital accumulation process 
given by (1) and the fact that the given initial human capital distribution  ) ( 0 ω h  is the same for 
both dynamic equilibria (see the proof of Proposition 1 for more details). Using the expressions 
in (30) and (33), we can state  
Fact:   ()
G
t I ω  is more unequal than   ()
F
t I ω  if and only if the following inequality is valid:   












This fact follows from the following known result (see, e.g., Karni and Zilcha (1994)): 
Lemma 1:  Consider a positive random variable   ) (ω I  with finite mean  )] ( [ ω I E I = . For any 





  dominates   21







We rewrite inequality (34) as equivalent to  
1 (1 ) (1 ) pp p β γβ δ δ
− <+ + −  or 
(35)                 
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) t pp p p β γθ γ β δ δ
− −− <+ + −  
Note that condition (35) certainly holds under parameter values typical of developed 
economies: for example, it is by far warranted if the capital income share δ  is around 0.3 while 
the social security tax rate  pγ  is at least 0.07. 
The above argument proves the following result: 
Proposition 2:  Assume that each of the alternative FF and PAYG social security regimes 
satisfies Conditions 1 and 2.  Then the inequality ranking of equilibrium intragenerational 
income distributions under the alternative regimes is determined by whether the parametric 
inequality (35) or its opposite is satisfied. In particular, if (35) is satisfied in period  t,  then the 
income distribution attained in a dynamic equilibrium in period  t  under the pay-as-you-go 
regime is more unequal than the one distribution under the fully-funded regime.  
 
Thus we have obtained strict ranking of equilibrium income distributions resulting under 
the two social security regimes: When the model’s parameters satisfy condition (35) imposed on 
the model’s parameters the fully funded system results in a more equal distribution of income. 
However, if the inequality in condition (35) is reversed then the result reverses as well: Under 
PAYG regime, income distribution is more equal than in the fully funded case. Note that if a 
stricter condition  
(36)              
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) pp p p β γγ β δ δ
− −< + + −   22
holds then (35) is met at all times, hence according to the Proposition the income distribution 
under the PAYG regime is at all times more unequal than the income distribution under the fully-
funded regime for respective dynamic equilibria.  
 
4.  Comparative Analysis of Dynamic Political Equilibrium  
We now define the political economy mechanism that determines the sequence of education tax 
rates  θt . Recall that the dynamic competitive equilibrium (DCE) (see its definition in Section 2) 
corresponds to a sequence of education tax rates { }
∞
=0 t t θ   assumed to be exogenously given. As 
demonstrated in Section 3, the DCE has Markov property, i.e., it can be defined recursively: 
given the DCE variables up to time t, the choice of tax rate θt uniquely determines the relevant 
batch of individual, aggregate, and policy variables of the DCE for the current period. In 
particular, the choice of  θt  determines the solution { } ) ( ), ( ), ( 1 , , ω ω ω t t t t t s c c +  of each household’s 
problem (2)-(4) in DCE as a function of  θt , and thereby the levels of welfare (4) attained by the 
households. Thus we have denoted these maximum value levels for each household  ω∈Ω  
explicitly as functions of  θt , namely Vt(ω, θt).  It is important to observe that a choice of tax 
level  θt  affects welfare of generation  t  individuals in two ways. The first effect is on the 
expenditure side: the tax obviously reduces their disposable income as seen from the budget 
equation (2). Secondly, it affects both their private retirement savings and public pension 
benefits expressed in formula (3). Indeed, it contributes to the next generation’s aggregate human 
capital  Ht+1  and thereby enhances return on the generation  t  retiree’s private investment; 
furthermore, formulae (7) and (8) show that under each of the alternative social security systems, 
a higher level of  Ht+1  also enhances public pensions received by generation  t  agents.  Also note   23
that the welfare of generation  t-1  retirees who are alive in period  t  is unaffected by the choice 
of tax rate  θt . Therefore we assume that only generation  t  individuals will be involved in the 
political process of determining the choice of  θt .  
 
Definition: Given the initial stock of physical capital K0  and the initial distribution of human 
capital h0(ω) for ω∈Ω,  a dynamic political equilibrium (DPE) is a sequence of education tax 
rates {}
∞
=0 t t θ  along with the corresponding dynamic competitive equilibrium (DCE) such that in 
any time period  t  the level of education tax rate  θt  is the most preferred by a majority of 
generation  t  individuals. In other words, any change in the value of  θt  accompanied by the 
corresponding change in DCE would reduce welfare levels for a majority of generation  t   
individuals. 
 
We will now compare the dynamic political equilibria resulting under the PAYG and 
fully funded social security regimes. 
 
Pay-as-you-go Social Security System 
The first order necessary and sufficient condition of maximum of the strictly concave welfare 
function  (,)
G
tt V ω θ  defined by the expression (29) is: 
(37)        















 Solving this equation we obtain the value of the optimal tax rate:  
(38)      
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Thus under the PAYG regime the welfare maximizing education tax rate is the same for all 
households  ω∈Ω , moreover it is constant over time.  Thus the DPE sequence of education tax 
rates under PAYG social security is given by the stationary optimal rate 
G θ .  
Note that according to expression (38) the optimal education tax rate 
G θ  is increasing 
with longevity, namely, that 






This is due to two effects of increasing longevity: it increases the weight of utility of the old-age 
consumption in individuals’ welfare function; on the other hand the actuarial value of lifetime 
income becomes more dependent on the social security tax revenues from future workers. We 






, i.e. the optimal level of education tax is lower the higher is the 
relative effectiveness of the home component in educating a child.  
 
Fully Funded Social Security System 
Optimal values of education tax rates are defined here by maximizing welfare function 
(,)
F
tt V ω θ  given by expression (21). Denote by  ()
F
t θ ω  the optimal choice of education tax by 
agent ω  at date t.  It is clear that, unlike the PAYG case, individually optimal tax rates  ()
F
t θ ω  
differ across households and time. 
The first order necessary condition of maximum of function  (,)
F
tt V ω θ  is: 
(40)        









β βδ βδ σ
ωθ
θω θ θ θ
∂ +− − −
=− + + =
∂− − −
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where function   ( ) t g ω  is as defined in (20).     Note that according to relationship (20) the value 
of  () t g ω  is positive if and only if   () tt hH ω >  , i.e., for households with above average income.  
  By directly comparing expressions (40) and (37) we see that if  () 0 t g ω ≤ ,which means 
that income of household ω  is at or below the average, then   (,)
F




 >  (,)
G












 this means that  ) , (
G F
t V θ ω
θ ∂
∂
 > 0 for all 
households with income at or below average. Thus all such households would always prefer that 
the education tax rate was set above 
G θ , i.e., the DPE value corresponding to the PAYG regime.  
  Consider now preferences of the households with above average income, i.e. such that 
() 0 t g ω > .  It is easy to see that the welfare function  (,)
F
tt V ω θ  is strictly concave when 
() 0 t g ω ≥ , therefore the most preferred education tax rates  ()
F
t θ ω  for such households are 
uniquely defined.  By differentiating the expression (40) with respect to household-specific value 











  which means that higher income households would 
always prefer to reduce the education tax rate chosen by the relatively lower income households.  
We can summarize this analysis as the following 
 
Lemma 2: Under fully funded social security, the most preferred education tax rates  ()
F
t θ ω  of 
households with above average incomes are uniquely defined and satisfy equation (40). 
Furthermore, the most preferred rate  ()
F
t θ ω is a decreasing function of household income.   
 
  Assume now that the social security tax rate under the fully funded system is identical to 
that of the PAYG  regime, i.e.,   F p τ γ = .  Then the function  () t g ω  is bounded above by  pγ  but   26
approaches it as household income grows relative to the mean. By continued comparison of 
relationships (37) and (40) one can see that when  () t g ω  is close enough to  pγ , then 
(,)
F




 <  (,)
G




 holds for all θ , so the households with relatively high values of 
() t g ω  prefer education tax rate lower than 
G θ .  Given the continuous negative relationship 
between the value of  () t g ω  (when it is positive) and a household’s most preferred level of 
education tax rate, as stated in Lemma 2, there is a cut-off value such that for all households with 
() t g ω  above that level, i.e., all households with income above the corresponding cut-off level, 
prefer that the education tax rate will be below 
G θ .  This result can be formulated as follows. 
 
Lemma 3: Assume that the social security tax rates applied under the FF and PAYG systems are 
identical, i.e.,   FG p τ τγ ==.  Then there is a number (the cut-off level of relative income) h
F > 1  







>  the most preferred 
education tax rate  ()
F
t θ ω  under the FF social security regime for generation  t, is below the 
value 
G θ  they would choose under the PAYG system. 






of the voters exceeds the 
value 
F h , then DPE education tax rate chosen under the fully funded regime is lower than 
G θ . 
Note that according to the evolution of human capital distribution defined by expression (1) if 
the above condition is valid at t=0, it will be also true for t=1,2,….Since 
F h >1, this condition 
means that the median income of the voters is sufficiently higher than the mean income of the 
entire working population.  It is a well known fact that the wealthier segments of the population 
typically have higher voting rate: see, for example, the findings in Nelson (1999) and Mahler   27
(2006). In particular, according to Table 3 in Mahler (2006), which summarizes data compiled in 
the  Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (2005), the median voter in 1996 US general 
elections was close to the 40-th percentile of income distribution. Also note that in a more 
complex reality of political process, wealthier individuals can have additional channels, other 
than direct voting, to exert a disproportionate influence on policy decisions.  In sum, it is 
reasonable to make an assumption that the outcome of a political process represents a preference 
of an individual with higher than average income, even if the overall income distribution is right 
skewed. 
  Given the initial human capital distribution   0() h ω  we thus impose: 
 






of the voters at t=0 exceeds the value 
F h  
defined in Lemma 3. 
 
We can then summarize the results of the above analysis: 
 
Theorem:  Assume that under both FF and PAYG social security regimes Conditions 1 and 3 
hold. Then, DPE education tax rates 
F
t θ  chosen at t=0,1,..  under the fully funded social security 
regime are below the DPE value 
G θ  obtained under the PAYG regime. 
 
The intuition for the Theorem’s result can be obtained by comparing the effects of the 
choice of an education tax rate  t θ  on individual households under the FF and PAYG regimes 
(see, in particular, expressions (17) and (21) under FF vs. (26) and (29) under PAYG). Such 
examination shows that under the PAYG system the choice of  t θ   affects all households 
proportionately, which is due to the fact that redistributive pension formula is tied under PAYG   28
to wages of the next generation. As a result, the optimal value of education tax 
G θ  given by 
formula (38) is the preferred uniform tax chosen by all households. By contrast, the effect of the 
choice of  t θ  under the FF regime is not proportionate: since this system redistributes wage 
incomes among the pension recipients, the cost of education tax relative to one’s contribution to 
the pension system is greater for higher income workers.  As a result the most preferred 
education rate  ()
F
t θ ω  decreases in household’s income, as stated in Lemma 2.    
  Thus, if Condition 2 of Section 3, according to which education tax rates are exogenously 
determined, is abandoned and instead a political mechanism is considered such that the education 
tax rate in each period is determined by majority of the relevant constituents, then the domination 
of the FF regime over PAYG in terms of economic growth, as established by Proposition 1, is 
called into question.  Indeed, while according to expressions (18) and (27) the FF regime is more 
conducive, ceteris paribus, of physical capital accumulation than PAYG, the opposite holds for 
the accumulation of human capital under the provisions of the Theorem since they imply that 
DPE education tax rates are higher under the PAYG regime. Therefore the possibility that the 
latter advantage of PAYG system can translate into higher rates of overall economic growth 
depends on whether it outweighs the comparative advantage of the FF regime on the physical 
capital side.  
Due to the limitations of the present model, such a clear-cut growth dominance result 
cannot be obtained under reasonable assumptions.  One of such limitations is that under the 
model’s simple demographic and tax structure, all the retirees remain neutral in the political 
process determining the current education tax rate since they neither pay it nor stand to benefit 
from the future productivity gains the tax will finance.  A more realistic model of education 
finance in most developed countries should include the retirees in the tax base (as, for example,   29
in Gradstein and Kaganovich, 2004).  This would (and does in reality) create a large voting block 
opposed to raising education taxes and would therefore shift the median voter further into the 
right tail of the income distribution in the working population (recall that due to mortality 
population of retirees is smaller than that of workers).  It appears plausible that this will imply a 
stronger dominance of the education tax rate chosen in political equilibrium under the PAYG 
system compared to the one chosen when pensions are fully funded, sufficiently so to also yield 
dominance in the overall growth rates. Such a model, however, adds an extra layer of technical 
complexity and we leave it outside the scope of the present paper.   
 
  Turning to the comparisons of income distributions resulting under PAYG and FF 
regimes, we find that the fact of Proposition 2, along with its proof, completely carries over to 
the comparison of dynamic political equilibria. Given the tax rates  ()
F
t θ ω  and the corresponding 
tax  
F
t θ  that is chosen in by majority rule in DPE under the FF regime, condition (35) is replaced 
by the similar one:  
(41)                 
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
F
t pp p p β γθ γ β δ δ
− −− <+ + −  
 
Corollary:  Let the provisions of the above Theorem be satisfied. Then the inequality ranking of 
DPE intragenerational income distributions under the alternative regimes is determined by 
whether  inequality (41) or its opposite is satisfied. In particular: 
(i) If (41) is satisfied in period  t,  then the income distribution attained in a dynamic equilibrium 
in period  t  under the pay-as-you-go regime is  more unequal than the respective income 
distribution under the fully-funded regime. Furthermore if a stricter condition (36) holds, then   30
income distribution in DPE under the PAYG regime is more unequal than the income 
distribution under the fully-funded regime at all times.  
(ii) If the opposite to inequality (41) is satisfied in period  t , i.e. 
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
F
t pp p p β γθ γ β δ δ
− −− >+ + −  
is true, then the income distribution  in period  t  under the pay-as-you-go regime is  more equal 
than the respective income distribution under the fully-funded regime. Furthermore if a stricter 
condition  
(42)            
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
G pp p p β γθ γ β δ δ
− −− >+ + −  
holds (recall that 
G θ is defined by formula (38)),  then income distribution in DPE under the 
PAYG regime is at all times more equal than the income distribution under the FF regime.  
 
  It is not hard to see, by substituting expression (38) in inequality (42),  that the inequality 
will be satisfied if  pγ ,  i.e. the relative size of social security system is sufficiently small.  Thus 
the DPE resulting when a small PAYG system is introduced will be characterized by higher rates 
of human capital accumulation as well as lower income inequality than the DPE under the 
corresponding fully funded alternative. 
 
  Finally, we note that as in the case of PAYG system (see inequality (39)), increasing 
longevity has a positive effect on DPE education tax rates under the FF regime. The following 
fact is proved in the Appendix: 
 
Lemma 5: Assume that Condition 3 is satisfied. Then under fully funded social security the DPE 







 holds for all  t. 
   31
  Lemma 5 along with inequality (39) confirm the understanding that public pension 
systems, both PAYG and fully funded, generate support for public investment in education. 
Indeed, according to these results this support is the stronger the higher survival to retirement.   
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Given the ongoing debate regarding the desirability of transition from pay-as-you-go social 
security regime to a fully-funded one, we compare dynamic equilibria under these two social 
security systems in an economy where human capital formation is a contributing factor to 
economic growth and public education provided by the government. We depart from the way 
social security systems were evaluated in the literature since we consider this issue in a wider 
framework: under the circumstances where the productivity of future workers can be 
endogenously affected. We focus on the comparison, date by date, of the equilibria under the 
PAYG and FF social security regimes with identical defined contribution rates. However, we do 
not consider a regime where social security system is absent altogether (see, e.g., Karni and 
Zilcha (1989) where this has been addressed for the case without endogenous growth), since in 
most developed economies social security programs are in place. Our study has also abstracted 
from the determination of ‘optimal social security tax rate’, due to the complexity of the political 
process under heterogeneous population (Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) analyzed this issue in a 
partial equilibrium within an economy with homogeneous population). The emphasis of our 
study is on the linkage between human capital formation and the social security benefits, since 
the effects of the alternative programs on the productivity of future workers are essential for 
determining their overall comparative outcomes.   32
  As far as we know, this paper presents the first analytical study that considers the 
comparison of pay-as-you-go and fully funded social security systems from the standpoint of 
their implications for the investment in future workers' productivity. We show that there is a 
natural link between the provision of defined contribution social security, investment in human 
capital and economic growth. Given the current ongoing discussion in the US and Europe 
regarding the transition from PAYG social security to fully funded system, it is important to 
include in the relevant arguments the measures taken to increase the productivity of the coming 
generations. 
  Since the vast majority of countries feature versions of PAYG social security systems 
(Netherlands and Chile are among the very few exceptions), the results obtained in our 
theoretical framework cannot be readily subjected to empirical verification. Most of these 
countries are facing increasing challenges to sustainability of their social security programs due 
to demographic changes (increasing longevity combined with falling fertility). Our study 
suggests that the ongoing discussions regarding transition to a fully funded system should take 
into account its effect on public education funding which is an important factor in increasing 
labor productivity, thus plays an important role in neutralizing adverse effects of falling 
dependency ratios.   
   33
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1:  Since the two DCE’s start from the same initial  0 K  and distribution  
) ( 0 ω h , we obtain  00 00 [] []
FG wH wH = . Since according to Condition 2 the same education tax 
rates are applied under both social security regimes, this along with expressions (18) and (27) 
implies: 
(A1)           
00 0 00 0
1 1
(1 )( ) (1 )( )
(1 ) 1
GF
G F pp w H p w H
K K
pp






At the same time we have  0 0 00 0 0 00 () ()
GG FF Xw H Xw H θθ == =, so (1) and (6) yield  11
GF H H = . 
The last equality combined with (A1) and (9) means that  11
GF YY <  and therefore according to 
(12) we obtain   11 11 [] []
GF wH wH < . 
  We now apply the induction argument. Indeed, provided that [] []
GF
tt tt wH wH <  we can 
write similarly to (A1): 
(A2)            1 1
(1 )( ) (1 )( )
(1 ) 1
GF
G F tt t tt t
t t
pp w Hp w H
K K
pp







Since   () ()
GG FF
t t tt t t tt Xw H Xw H θθ =< =  we conclude from (1) and (6) that  11
GF
tt H H ++ < . Then 
due to (A2) similarly to the above logic  11
GF
tt YY + + <  and thereby   11 11 [] []
GF
tt tt wH wH ++ ++ < , which 
completes the induction proof. 
 
Proof of Lemma 5:   
Differentiating equation (38) with respect to longevity parameter  p  and rearranging we reach,   34
(A3)  
22 2
1( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
(1 ( ) ) (1 )











⎡⎤ +− − −





By comparing equation (40) with the right-hand-side of (A3) we can conclude that the latter is 
positive when  ()
F
t θ θω = .  Furthermore, the expression 
  22 2
1( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
(1 ( ) ) (1 ) t
pp p
g















 which, as has been noted, is positive when 









 is true whenever    () tt hH ω >  . This 
fact establishes the Lemma’s result because according to Condition 3 the inequality  () tt hH ω >  
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